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Abstract
We argue that diagnosis should not be seen as solving a problem with a unique
definition, but rather that there exists a whole space of reasonable notions of diagnosis.
These notions can be seen as mutual approximations. We present a number of reasons
for choosing among different notions of diagnosis. We also present an exhaustive
categorisation of techniques that can be employed to obtain approximations, as well
as a number of specific example techniques for each category. We also show that it
is possible to characterise the relations between the approximations obtained by these
techniques.
1 Introduction
The AI literature contains many definitions for diagnostic reasoning. Implicitly or explicitly,
these papers make many assumptions about the kind of knowledge that is assumed to be
available, and the kind of properties that a diagnosis is supposed to satisfy. Tacitly these
papers claim that if these assumptions are satisfied, they present the appropriate definition
of diagnosis. However, there are two reasons why we should not search for the appropriate
definition of diagnosis, but instead search for alternative definitions, and investigate how they
relate to each other. Firstly, the choice of an appropriate definition of diagnosis depends on
the purpose for which diagnosis is performed, and the circumstances under which this must
be done. Secondly, both data and knowledge involved in diagnosis are often incomplete.
The resulting failure of one definition of diagnosis can often be dealt with by choosing
another, related notion of diagnosis.
In this paper, we view different definitions of diagnosis as approximations of each other.
This enables us to give (i) a number of concrete reasons for switching between different
definitions, (ii) a categorisation of techniques to obtain approximations, and (iii) concrete
techniques for each of these different approximation categories.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 are introductory: Sec. 2
elaborates on the motivation for studying approximations in diagnosis and gives some initial
examples, Sec. 3 recalls some standard definitions and introduces some terminology. The
main substance of the paper is in Sec. 4–5. Section 4 lists a number of reasons which
may cause us to move from any given definition of diagnosis to an approximation. Sec. 5
distinguishes categories of techniques for obtaining such approximations and gives extensive
examples of each category. Section 6 discusses related work and Sec. 7 concludes.
2 Motivation
In this section we elaborate on the reasons which make approximations in diagnosis an
important subject of study, and we give some examples of the use of such approximations.
The definition of diagnosis depends on purpose and circumstances. Diagnosis is
often taken as “finding the reasons that explain observed abnormal behaviour”. However,
diagnosis is never performed for its own sake, and always serves some exterior motive
like repair, damage prevention, symptom suppression, etc. Therefore, how the informal
notion of diagnosis should be interpreted is strongly determined by the purpose for which
we perform diagnosis, and the circumstances under which this must be done. We give three
examples.
[PNdK94] has studied the behaviour of telephone operators at an emergency switchboard
who must decide whether an emergency call requires an ambulance to be sent. These
operators engage in a dialogue that leads to a diagnostic process, but their goal is not to
perform a precise diagnosis. Given the dramatic consequences of erroneously failing to send
an ambulance, their diagnostic reasoning stops as soon as the set of candidate hypotheses
contains a single cause which merits an ambulance. Thus, they approximate a precise
diagnosis by checking only if an urgent cause is a possibility.
The converse happens when a physician has to decide whether or not to administer a
severe drug treatment with possibly dangerous side effects. Such a high-risk decision is
only taken if all the other diagnoses that might lead to less severe treatments have been ruled
out. Thus, here diagnosis is interpreted as reasoning until only one conclusion remains,
quite the converse of the behaviour of the switch board operators.
A third and final example can be found in the behaviour of a computer technician who
diagnosis a faulty computer. In order to localise the fault, technicians may reason in terms
of individual components, and will entertain different hypotheses consisting of sets of faulty
components. However, as soon as all remaining competing hypotheses contain components
from the same physical board, technicians will abort their diagnostic reasoning and simply
replace the board. Here again, we see how the purpose of the diagnosis (in this case repairing
the computer by replacing a board) causes the technician to be satisfied with an approximate
diagnosis instead of a precise diagnosis.
Incompleteness of data and knowledge. In an ideal world, we would have complete
knowledge about the object under diagnosis and its observed behaviour. We would then
be able to uniquely identify the set of causes responsible for this behaviour. However, in
practice both knowledge and observations are incomplete. As a result, diagnosis often yields
multiple candidate causes among which we cannot further distinguish, or, perhaps worse, it
may fail to yield any candidate at all. In both cases, we must consider approximations of
such results in order to enable further action. We give an example of either case.
Consider a doctor who cannot further discriminate among competing sets of disorders
that are responsible for a set of symptoms. Unfortunately, each candidate set would require
a different treatment and applying all treatments simultaneously is impossible because of
interactions among the drugs involved. A reasonable approximation this doctor may choose
is to ignore some of the less severe symptoms, and see if the remaining set of severe
symptoms is amenable to a single treatment. Similarly, when no single explanation can
be found, reducing the set of observations may enable an explanation of at least the most
urgent subset of the symptoms.
The above has illustrated how both the purpose of diagnosis and the circumstances
under which it is performed, as well as the incompleteness of both data and knowledge
may cause us to consider alternative definitions of diagnosis which can be seen as mutual
approximations.
3 Basic Definitions
Here we introduce a number of standard definitions from the diagnostic literature. Our
definitions are based on [CT90]. We assume that the model of the system under diagnosis
(called the system description, or SD) is defined as a causal network plus a definition of
diagnostic labels:
System description: A system description SD is a set of formulae SD   CN  DL,
where CN is a causal network and DL is a definition of diagnostic labels.
Causal Network: Let    1   2 			
 be a set of predicate letters called causal states,
let    1   2 		
 be a set of predicate letters called condition symbols, to describe
observations which need not be explained, and let    1   2 		
 be a set of predicate
letters called assumption symbols that represent unknown conditions, then a causal network
CN is a set of implications of one of the following two forms:
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3 is to be read as: under condition  1, states  1 and  2 together
may cause state  3 (depending on the unknown truth of  1). If  1 were not present,  1
!

2
would necessarily cause  3 whenever  1 were true.
Diagnostic labels: Let &  '( 1  ( 2 		
 be a set of predicate letters called diagnostic
labels, then a diagnostic label definition is a set of equivalences of the form )   +* ( ﬀ .
We will write def ﬂ ( ﬀ  for the set of the   . A diagnostic label defines a name for a set of
states that somehow “belong together” because they form a known syndrome, or because
they require the same treatment or any other reason.
Coherent: A set of states STATES ,- is called coherent iff there exists a set of labels
LBLS ,.& such that DL / STATES
*
LBLS1, in other words: a coherent set of states can
be exactly characterised by a set of diagnostic labels.
Observations: The set of observations 0 of a causal network CN are those 

that
only occur in the right-hand side of implications in CN. These are the states that must be
explained.
These different categories of knowledge can then be used to give particular definitions
of a diagnostic problem and its solution.
1A set of formulae that occurs in a formula is to be read as a conjunction.
Diagnostic problem: A diagnostic problem DP is a tuple   SD

OBS

CXT  , with SD a
system description, OBS ,-0 and CXT ,  .
Diagnostic Relation and solution:. A triple SOL     ASS

STATES

LBLS  with ASS ,
 , STATES ,. and LBLS , & is a solution to a diagnostic problem DP under diagnostic
relation DR iff relation DR holds between DP and SOL, written DR ﬂ DP

SOL

. A particular
diagnostic relation DR may only involve one or two of the components of SOL, in which
case we shall write SOL as a unary or binary tuple.
Example: Abductive relation and solution. A common example of a diagnostic
relation and solution is the standard notion of abduction from e.g. [CT90] in which a
solution is a set of assumptions symbols and diagnostic labels which imply all of the observed
observations, and do not imply any of the absent observations. SOL     ASS

LBLS  is a
solution for diagnostic problem DP      CN

DL 

OBS

CXT  under the abductive diagnostic
relation iff:
CN  DL  CXT  ASS  LBLS / OBS  and (3)
OBS   CN  DL  CXT  ASS  LBLS /  (4)
where OBS

  OBS and OBS

  
		
0 OBS
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It is important to emphasise that although we assume that SD is a set of Horn clauses
plus diagnostic labels, we do not assume any particular definition of a diagnostic relation
DR. Indeed, DR is one of the concepts that we will vary in our study of approximations.
The above definition of an abductive solution is only an example of a particular notion of
diagnosis.
Finally, we introduce some terminology to speak about approximations:
Exact diagnosis: We call a solution SOL an exact diagnosis for a diagnostic problem
DP under a diagnostic relation DR iff DR ﬂ DP

SOL

holds.
Approximate diagnosis: We call SOL an approximate diagnosis for DP under DR
iff DR  ﬂ DP

SOL

holds for some approximation DR  of DR, or if DR
ﬂ
DP 

SOL

holds for
some approximation DP  of DP. Thus, an approximate diagnosis for a given problem and
diagnostic relation is an exact diagnosis for an approximation of the problem or of the
relation. What approximations of diagnostic problems and relations are will be the topic of
subsequent sections.
Over- and under-diagnosis: A diagnosis is an over-diagnosis (under-diagnosis)for a
given problem DP if it accounts for a superset (subset) of the observations in DP. Of course,
an approximate diagnosis may be simultaneously an over and an under diagnosis.
4 Reasons for computing approximate diagnoses
In this section, we enumerate a number of reasons for computing approximate diagnoses
instead of only exact solutions. Whereas the motivating examples from Sec. 2 were
all phrased in terms of application specific properties (e.g. the risk of not sending an
ambulance), here we will phrase the reasons for computing approximate diagnoses in terms
of domain independent properties of a diagnosis.
(R1) Reduce the number of diagnoses. In general, for a given DP and DR, the relation
DR
ﬂ
DP

SOL

may hold for more than one value of SOL. This is problematic if these
competing values for SOL imply different actions (e.g. repair) to be taken. We can try
to adjust DR to DR  so that DR  ﬂ DP

SOL 

holds for fewer values SOL  (and similarly by
adjusting DP). The solutions SOL  can then be taken as approximations of the solutions SOL.
The most commonly found example of this in diagnostic reasoning is known as Occam’s
Razor: among a number of competing diagnoses with the same explanatory power, select the
simplest under some appropriate definition of “simple”. In our terminology, this amounts
to obtaining DR  by adding the selection criterion to DR.
(R2) Increase the number of diagnoses. The converse of (R1) may also happen:
DR
ﬂ
DP

SOL

may not hold for any value SOL. A common example of this is that all combi-
nations of causes fail to explain a symptom that has nevertheless been observed. A total lack
of solutions would imply a total inability to act, eg. an inability to decide which treatment
to administer to a patient. It is therefore quite common for a physician to accept a diagnosis
even when not all symptoms have been accounted for. In our terminology, approximating
DP by DP  (by ignoring some observations) may lead to a solution DR ﬂ DP 

SOL 

whereas
no solution existed for DR
ﬂ
DP

SOL

. Notice that in this case, SOL’ is an under-diagnosis
for DP.
(R3) Reduce the size of a diagnosis. Besides the number of alternative values of SOL
for which DR
ﬂ
DP

SOL

holds, further problems may be caused by the size of an individual
solution SOL. This corresponds to the dilemma of a doctor whose patient suffers from a large
number of diseases. When treating all diseases simultaneously is not possible, the doctor
may choose to diagnose only the most severe complaints (ie. change from DP to DP  with
a reduced observation set), and solve DR ﬂ DP 

SOL 

instead, and treat only those diseases
found in SOL  (where presumably SOL   SOL). Again, SOL’ would be an under-diagnosis
for DP.
(R4) Make a diagnosis coherent. The reason for introducing the diagnostic labels &
in our system description (following [CT90]) is that in realistic applications, even when
reasoning in terms of causal states is possible, meaningful diagnoses are often not phrased
in terms of such states. Instead, a separate vocabulary is created to express the diagnostic
solutions. Physicians often speak in terms of syndromes, which consist of causal states
that together form a coherent disease pattern. Such syndromes are used in communication
among physicians, and in therapy planning. In many domains, an incoherent diagnosis
that does not correspond to a set of diagnostic labels is of as little value as no diagnosis at
all, since no meaningful action can be associated with such an incoherent diagnosis. It is
then attractive to try to find an approximate diagnosis which, although not exact, is at least
coherent, and therefore allows us to undertake an action.
(R5) Make a diagnosis complete. We call a diagnosis complete if it contains at least all
the real causes of the observed complaints (and perhaps some more). In practice, because
our knowledge is often insufficient, we can of course seldom be certain that a diagnosis is
complete. Nevertheless, in many domains it is of the utmost importance that a diagnosis
is complete, because missing out some of the real causes may have dramatic consequences
(eg. not sending an ambulance, in Sec. 2). It is then attractive to calculate approximations
which may be too large, but which give us a higher confidence that the real causes of the
observed behaviour are included in the approximation (perhaps at the expense of including
additional irrelevant causes). In general, such approximations will be over-diagnoses.
(R6) Make a diagnosis sound. The converse of (R5) is to make a diagnosis sound (ie.
to ensure that it contains only real causes, but perhaps not all of them). This is useful in
applications where administering the wrong treatment (or performing the wrong repair) is
as disastrous as taking no action at all. In such a case, we may want to compute approximate
solutions which are so small that they perhaps do not include all causes, but of the causes
they do include, we can be certain that they are among the real causes of the complaints.
Diagnoses computed for this reason will often be under-diagnoses.
This concludes our list of reasons why approximate diagnoses may be attractive, and
sometimes even more attractive than “exact” solutions.
5 Techniques for computing approximate diagnoses
We now proceed to describe a number of techniques that can be used for computing an
approximate diagnosis. Our definition of an approximate diagnosis SOL’ for a diagnostic
problem DP and diagnostic relation DR was that either DR’(DP,SOL’) or DR(DP’,SOL’)
should hold for some approximation DP’ of DP or DR’ of DR. This enables us to categorise
all the techniques for computing approximate diagnoses into two categories: those that vary
DR and those that vary DP. Those that vary the diagnostic relation DR can be divided into
three subclasses, depending on whether they adjust (a) the provability relation used in DR,
(b) the definitions of the different categories of observations that occur in this relation, or (c)
the selection of final solutions from among the possible candidate solutions of this relation.
The other techniques wich vary the diagnostic problem DP can be subdivided on the basis
of the part of DP     SD

OBS

CXT  that they vary. Some methods vary the case specific
parameters of a problem (OBS and CXT), others adjust the case independent parameters
(SD). In this section we will discuss example techniques from each of these categories.
If we want to use these techniques for computing approximate diagnoses, we also need to
know their relative strengths: does one approximation also compute all solutions of another,
are all solutions of one approximation larger than those of another, etc. We shall also discuss
examples of such relations that hold between the approximation techniques that we present.
5.1 Adjusting the diagnostic relation
This class of approximations is based on adjusting various aspects of the relation we demand
between observed values, the causal network and possible explanations. An example of
such a relation is (3)–(4) above, and we will use this as our example.
Adjusting observation categories
Variations of (3)–(4) can be obtained by changing the construction of OBS

and OBS

from
OBS. The example (3)–(4) from Sec. 3 stated:
(OBS1): OBS

  OBS and OBS

 .
	

 	


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.
We can obtain over-diagnoses by dropping the consistency demand (4):
(OBS2): OBS

  OBS and OBS

  
,
Alternatively, we could drop (3). Under the following definition of OBS

we obtain
something very close to consistency-based diagnosis [Rei87].
(OBS3): OBS

   and OBS

  
	

	

 OBS


[CT92] define a whole variety of diagnostic relations in this way, and prove theorems about
their inclusion relations. Among other things, they propose to partition OBS into normal
and abnormal observations: OBS   OBS   OBS  , and to take
(OBS4): OBS

  OBS  and OBS

  OBS  .
This has the effect that a solution explains all the abnormal observations and does not
contradict any of the normal observations.
A final variation can be obtained as follows. (OBS1) Assumes that any value outside
OBS

must be taken as negative. This very strong closed world assumption can be relaxed
by allowing OBS to contain negative as well as positive literals, and then define:
(OBS5): OBS

  	

 OBS


and OBS

 .
	

 OBS


.
When computing approximate diagnoses, it is important to know the relative strengths of
the different diagnostic relations defined in this way. For the cases described above, we can
prove:
Property: OBS3
 
OBS1

OBS2

OBS4

OBS5
Adjusting the provability relation
Almost all definitions of diagnostic relations are expressed in terms of the standard prov-
ability relation / . We can therefore adjust DR by using a non-standard definition of / in
(3)–(4).
For instance, we may want to approximate / by a relation that is easier to compute.
An example of this occurs when we allow negative literals in OBS and then use negation
as failure (written /    ). Under the assumption that CN is Horn (as everywhere in this
paper), we can then show the following:
Property:
If DR and DR’ are defined as in (3)–(4) but using /   instead of / ,
and they satisfy OBS   OBS

 OBS

then DR(DP,SOL) iff DR’(DP,SOL) for any DP and SOL

This states that when approximating / by /   , many variations OBSi from the previous
section are no longer useful. For the examples from the previous section in particular we
would have OBS2
*
OBS4
*
OBS5.
An altogether different approximation is inspired by [CS91]. They define approximate
deduction relations which are sound (but incomplete) or complete (but unsound) approxi-
mations of / and / . These approximations can be substituted in (3) and (4). In this way,
we can reduce both the number and the size of the solutions obtained.
Adjusting the selection criterion
Almost every notion of diagnosis described in the literature contains a criterion to select the
most prefered solution from among all logically possible ones. This is often formulated as
selecting the minimal elements of some ordering on the solutions. By strengthening this
selection criterion, we obtain less solutions.
The most common orderings in the literature are syntactic properties such as set-inclusion
(we write   -min) or cardinality ordering (#-min). Both #-min and   -min are versions of
Occam’s Razor, but in general #-min only makes sense if the elements of the minimised set
can be assumed to be independent.
Besides these syntactic orderings, we can also select solutions on more semantic grounds.
A simple version of this is to order the elements of  or & (e.g. based on their urgency)
and then to extend this to an ordering on sets of these elements such as STATES or LBLS.
In [vHtT94], we have proposed a selection mechanism (which we shall write P-min) based
on annotating the causal links in CN with preference conditions, and then to select those
solutions that make maximal use of preferred links.
In order to investigate more sophisticated selection mechanisms, we need a calculus of
minimalities. In [tTvH94] we have proposed the following operations. If   1 and   2 are
two orderings, then we can construct the intersection and union of their minimal elements
(written ﬂ   1 &   2

and
ﬂ
  1

  2
 ), or we can construct the lexicographic combination of
  1 and   2 (written
ﬂ
  1;   2
 ). This is useful since minimal elements under ﬂ   1;   2

-min
are guaranteed to exists whenever they exist under   1 and   2, which does not hold for
ﬂ
  1 &   2

-min.
Using this notation, we can investigate how combinations of orderings behave. For
instance, for #-min,   -min and P-min we have:
Property:
#&P-min

#;P-min

#-min
  
  &P-min

  ;P-min

  -min
We can also show under which circumstances combinations of minimalities have an
approximating effect. The following shows that this is not always the case:
Property: if   1-min

  2-min
then   1-min  
ﬂ
  1 &   2

-min  
ﬂ
  1;   2

-min
and   2-min  
ﬂ
  1

  2

-min

5.2 Adjusting the diagnostic problem
Adjusting the case-specific part
When the exact solutions for a given problem do not suffice, we may be better of with the
solutions for a slightly adjusted version of the problem. We now discuss techniques that
yield solutions for problems whose case-specific part (CXT,OBS) are approximations of
those in the original problem.
The most obvious possibility is to manipulate the set OBS directly. We can impose a
semantic ordering on 0 (e.g. based on the danger of the observations). If solutions SOL to
DR
ﬂ
  SD

OBS

CXT 

SOL

do not suffice, than we can create under-diagnoses by removing
elements from OBS which are low in this ordering.
We can also try to find syntactic reasons for removing elements from OBS, such as
ignoring aspecific symptoms (symptoms which can be caused by many different causes).
Approximate problems can also be found by manipulating the STATES involved in the
exact solution of the original problem. An example of this is a method to ensure a complete
diagnosis (see Sec. 4), by simply taking the union of all competing solutions. By a similar
method we can obtain a sound approximation by taking the intersection over all competing
solutions.
Many measures for making a diagnosis coherent also fall in this category. If a set is not
coherent because only a few states are missing or superfluous, then we can add or remove
such states from the solution, particularly if the offending states are low in some ordering of
importance on  . Besides such a semantic ordering, we may use syntactic measures on the
importance of a state for the coherence of STATES, for instance by counting in how many
labels a given state plays a role. Besides orderings on  , orderings on & can also be used to
decide how to make a diagnosis coherent.
Adjusting the case-independent part
The final category of techniques for computing approximations concerns permanent adjust-
ments to the case-independent knowledge encoded in the causal network and the diagnostic
labels. Due to space limitations, we will not discuss any details here, but only mention
that an example would be a technique for specialising the network for certain classes of
observations (e.g. common complaints, or dangerous ones), by applying techniques like
partial evaluation, known from program transformation.
6 Related work
[PP91] motivates that the diagnostic problem, in most formal theories of diagnosis is
incomplete, because the observation and hyptoheses phases are only considered and the
treatment phases is not considered at all. As result these diagnosis approaches ignore utility
considerations totally. This corresponds what we explain as the choice of an appropriate
definition of diagnosis depends on the purpose for which diagnosis is performed.
Struß[Str92] was perhaps the first to consider the problem of choosing an appropriate
notion of diagnosis as part of solving a diagnostic problem. His work lead Bo¨tcher and
Dressler to design the system Magellan [BD93], which explicitly models assumptions
about the notion of diagnosis it uses, and can choose a different notion by changing these
assumptions. Junker [Jun91] also shows a way of representing the assumptions underlying
various diagnostic notions, and defines partial orders between them. His work can be seen
as an alternative formulation of diagnostic assumption. All of this work deals mainly with
consistency based diagnosis, whereas our notions of diagnosis also easily accomodate for
abductive diagnosis.
We discussed a number of techniques for obtaining approximations, but our examples
are by no means exhaustive. Two papers that present other techniques are [PEB94] which
discusses various forms of abductive reasoning (instances of DR in our terminology), and
[Bos94] which discusses approximations obtained by making abstractions of the system
description SD.
7 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have argued that diagnosis should not be seen as solving a problem with
a unique definition, but rather that there exists a whole space of reasonable notions of
diagnosis, and that these notions can be seen as mutual approximations (Sec. 2). We have
presented a number of reasons for choosing among different notions of diagnosis (Sec.
4). We also presented an exhaustive categorisation of techniques that can be employed to
obtain approximations (Sec. 5), as well as a number of specific example techniques for
each category. We also showed that it is possible to characterise the relations between the
approximations obtained by these techniques.
The perspective on diagnosis taken in this paper opens up a number of new questions.
Of course, many additional techniques can be defined, and some of our definitions are
only very simple first versions. However, for our techniques to become really useful, more
fundamental questions also need to be answered. We must investigate the applicability
criteria which determine when each approximation technique should be used. Furthermore,
the techniques together with their applicability criteria should be incorporated in a compu-
tational architecture that can exploit these notions when performing diagnosis. Both these
topics are the subject of our current research.
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